

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 ROME 11644 261350Z

43

ACTION PM-07

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 INR-11 NEA-14 CIAE-00 NSAE-00

RSC-01 MC-02 ACDA-19 L-03 DRC-01 /084 W

----- 059427

R 261319Z AUG 74

FM AMEMBASSY ROME

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6574

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

SECNAV WASHDC

SECAF WASHDC

JCS

CNO

USCINCEUR

CINCUSNAVEUR

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

S E C R E T ROME 11644

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MPOL, PINR, US, IT

SUBJECT: US NAVY MARITIME SURVEILLANCE TESTS

REFS: A. STATE 173784

B. ROME 11364

C. ROME 11629

1. SUMMARY. IT IS EMBASSY'S VIEW THAT A GOI DECISION ON THIS MATTER WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE AT THE CABINET LEVEL, WOULD BE DIFFICULT AND TIME CONSUMING AT BEST, AND HENCE WOULD NECESSITATE HIGH LEVEL AND SUSTAINED ACTION ON OUR PART. IF THE PROPOSED OPERATION IS ESSENTIAL TO US AND THE NATO ALLIANCE THE GOI COULD PROBABLY BE BROUGHT ON BOARD, BUT ONLY AT THE EXPENSE OF POLITICAL CAPITAL WHICH COULD WELL BE NEEDED LATER FOR OTHER MEDITERRANEAN, NATO RELATED REQUESTS. END SUMMARY.

2. WHILE THE ITALIANS HAVE ON BALANCE BEEN VERY COOPERATIVE HOSTS FOR US-NATO FACILITIES, THEY HAVE BEEN COMING UNDER

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 ROME 11644 261350Z

PUBLIC PRESSURE FROM THE SOCIALISTS AND COMMUNISTS (BOTH

PCI AND PRAVDA) REGARDING ITALY'S EXPOSED POSITION AS THE "SOLE" NATO BASE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN THE LIGHT OF THE CYPRUS CRISIS (SEE REFTELS B & C). GOAL OF THESE PRESS ATTACKS HAS BEEN TO PRE-EMPT THE ISSUE PUBLICLY IN A MANNER THAT WOULD MAKE IT POLITICALLY COSTLY FOR THE CENTER-LEFT COALITION TO RESPOND PROMPTLY AND POSITIVELY SHOULD THE US REQUEST ADDITIONAL FACILITIES IN ITALY. IT IS THE EMBASSY'S BELIEF THAT WE SHOULD AVOID MAKING CONTROVERSIAL REQUESTS OF OUR ITALIAN FRIENDS UNLESS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL.

3. GIVEN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVERBERATIONS FELT WHENEVER THE NAME U-2 IS MENTIONED, WE BELIEVE THIS OPERATION FALLS WITHIN THE CATEGORY OF QUOTE CONTROVERSIAL END QUOTE. THE U-2 PLATFORM ITSELF WOULD GIVE THE GOI DIFFICULTY EVEN IF THE PROJECT COULD BE KEPT SECRET AND ITS URGENCY WERE EXPLAINED. GIVEN THE OPEN NATURE OF THE OPERATION, THE U-2'S USE WOULD PROBABLY BE IN THE PRESS EVEN BEFORE OPERATIONS HAD BEGUN. ON THE OTHER HAND IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO GUARANTEE THAT EVEN A COVERT OPERATION COULD BE KEPT OUT OF THE MEDIA FOR LONG, AND MERE RUMORS OF A SECRET U-2 OPERATION WOULD CAUSE THE PRESENT WEAK GOI COALITION PROBLEMS.

4. ITALIANS WOULD NO DOUBT ASK US IMMEDIATELY HOW THIS OPERATION FITS INTO NATO SURVEILLANCE PLANS AND WHETHER IT IS A NATO APPROVED OPERATION. EMBASSY IS NOT CONVINCED THAT OUR OFFER TO PROVIDE GOI AND NATO WITH SANITIZED VERSION OF MATERIAL GLEANED DURING THESE TESTS WOULD SUFFICE. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE OPERATION COULD BE OFFICIALLY SUBSUMED UNDER NATO RUBRIC, AND REQUEST FOR GOI COOPERATION WERE TO COME VIA BRUSSELS, GOI MIGHT FIND IT EASIER TO SAY YES. HOWEVER, GIVEN USE OF U-2 AND PRESENT LOCAL CONTROVERSY RE ANY AUGMENTATION OF US OR NATO MILITARY IN ITALY, EVEN SUCH A NATO REQUEST MIGHT NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME GOI NERVOUSNESS.

5. CONCLUSION: IF AN AIRFRAME OTHER THAN THE U-2 OR EQUALLY FAMOUS RB-71 COULD BE SUBSTITUTED, AND IF WE COULD WAIT FOR CYPRUS RELATED LEFT-WING ANTI-NATO RHETORIC HOPEFULLY TO DIE DOWN, THEN OPERATION WOULD OBVIOUSLY BECOME MORE FEASIBLE. OTHERWISE, WE MUST CONSIDER THAT THE OPERATION WOULD DRAW HEAVILY ON OUR STOCK OF GOODWILL WITH OUR ECONOMICALLY AND SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 ROME 11644 261350Z

POLITICALLY HARRIED ITALIAN FRIENDS, AND THAT ONLY A VERY HIGH LEVEL USG EFFORT, WITH A STRONG CASE FOR THE UTTER ESSENTIALITY OF THE OPERATION, WOULD PRODUCE EVEN A DECENT CHANCE OF GOI REACHING A POSITIVE DECISION. VOLPE

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** SURVEILLANCE, COLLECTIVE SECURITY, MILITARY POLICIES, MILITARY PLANS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 26 AUG 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974ROME11644  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D740235-0577  
**From:** ROME  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1974/newtext/t19740818/aaaaaoug.tel  
**Line Count:** 111  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION PM  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** A. STATE 173784  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** golinofr  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 05 APR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <05 APR 2002 by shawdg>; APPROVED <26 JUN 2002 by golinofr>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** US NAVY MARITIME SURVEILLANCE TESTS  
**TAGS:** MPOL, PINR, US, IT  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005